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Pilots Collide with the Motorship FSIA
Robert M. Jarvis*
INTRODUCTION
Since its adoption in 1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)1 has been the subject of extensive debate.2 Much of the debate
* B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Member, New York and
California Bars. The author practices admiralty law in New York City with the firm of Baker &
McKenzie. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily repre-
sent those of any other person or entity.
1 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891-2897, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332 (a)(2), (4), 1391
(f), 1441 (d) and 1602-1611 (1982). All section references are to Title 28 unless otherwise indicated.
2 Long before the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), numerous com-
mentators had discussed the need for such an act. See eg., Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign
States - A Proposal for Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901 (1969), which, after
tracing the development of the United States law of sovereign immunity, proposed a "solution" to
the problem. During the years leading up to the eventual enactment of the FSIA, numerous false
starts were made in the Congress. An early proposal, known as Senate Bill 566, was withdrawn after
it became clear that it could not win adoption. For a discussion of S. 566, see Note, Public Debt and
Sovereign Immunity: Some Considerations Pertinent to S. 566, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 745 (1973); Note,
The Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns in U.S. Courts - Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. &
POL. 473 (1973); Note, The Statutory Proposal to Regulate the Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 6 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 549 (1973). Following the withdrawal of S. 566, a new measure was
introduced into the House as H.R. 11315. For a discussion of H.R. 11315, see Atkeson, H.R. 11315
- The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action. 70 AM. J. INT'L
L. 298 (1976); Note, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity Revisited: Some Considerations Pertinent




has been spawned by the often careless drafting of the Act's language, a
fact which has been repeatedly commented upon? With the approach of
the tenth anniversary of the Act's passage, numerous amendments are
being put forth for consideration by Congress.4 In the main, these pro-
posals focus on correcting language which has proven to be problematic
in practice.5 Some of the proposals seek to reopen old battles that were
fought, and lost by one side or another, prior to the Act's initial ap-
proval. A few have gone so far as to suggest scrapping the Act entirely
and starting over.6
The purpose of this article is neither to exhaustively review the legis-
lative history of the Act,7 nor to comment on the various amendments
draw criticism. See Note, "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1975" [sic]. Reflections on Old
Problems in a New Bill, 5 BLACK L. J. 270 (1977); Note, Sovereign Immunity - Limits of Judicial
Control - The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARv. INT'L L. J. 429 (1977); Roberts
and Warren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act" Where Did Our Remedies Go?, 3 MAR. LAW.
155 (1978). This criticism led to calls for amending the Act. See, eg., Smit, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976: A Plea for Drastic Surgery, 74 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PRoc. 49 (1980). Other
commentators, who were more favorably inclined to the Act, merely sought to formulate guidelines
to supplement the Act. See Kahale, Arbitration and Choice-of-Law Clauses as Waivers of Jurisdic-
tional Immunity, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29 (1981); Comment, Suing a Foreign Government
Under the United States Antitrust Laws: The Need for Clarification of the Commercial Activity Ex-
ception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657 (1979); Note,
Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process Clause, 55
N.Y.U. L. REv. 474 (1980); N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29 (1981); Note, Suits by Foreigners Against
Foreign States in United States Courts, 90 YALE L. . 1861 (1981).
3 See, eg., Delaume, Sovereign Immunity in America: A Bicentennial Accomplishment, 8 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 349 (1977); Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sov-
ereign Immunity (Parts I-V), 85 CoM. L. J. 167, 228, 298, 364, 497 (1980). See also Smit, supra note
2.
4 On August 8, 1984, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates approved proposed
amendments to the FSIA which had been recommended by the Association's Section of Interna-
tional Law and Practice. For a discussion of the ABA's proposals, see Burrows and Newman, Pro-
posed Amendments Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
5 The Maritime Law Association of the United States, for example, has suggested an amend-
ment which would make the Ship Mortgage of Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C. § 911-984
(1982), mesh with the FSIA. Under the proposed change, mortgages on foreign state-owned vessels
would be permitted to be foreclosed in accordance with the Ship Mortgage Act. The Maritime Law
Association of the United States, Document No. 657 at 8169, 8170 (Nov. 2, 1984).
6 The International Law Association, for example, has suggested that the subject of foreign
sovereign immunity should be handled on an international, rather than national, basis. To that end,
the Association has prepared a Draft Convention on Foreign Sovereign Immunity. See International
Law Association, Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity (1983), in International Law
Association, Report of the Sixtieth Conference (1982), reprinted in 22 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS
(1983). The Convention is discussed in Note, The International Law Association Draft Convention on
Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative Approach, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 635 (1983).
7 For a discussion of the FSIA's legislative history, see McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1977); Note, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 Giving the Plaintiff His Day In Court, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 543
(1977); Note, Sovereign Immunity, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 491 (1977); Recent Developments, Foreign
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and corrections which have been put forth. Instead, this article focuses
on one small problem contained in one discrete section of the Act. The
provision which forms the basis of this article is § 1605(b), s and the prob-
lem that will be discussed is the rule announced in that section which
prohibits the arrest of a vessel owned by a foreign sovereign. Because
much has been written about the arrest provisions of the FSIA,9 this
article will approach the section from a perspective not previously dis-
cussed: torts committed while the vessel is under the command of a
compulsory pilot.10
The article will begin with a discussion of what compulsory pilots
are and the general legal rules applicable to them. The article will then
examine whether the FSIA modifies the usual compulsory pilot rules
and, if so, the consequences of that modification. It will be argued that
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976- Judicial Predominance, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 146 (1977).
See also supra note 2.
8 Section 1605(b) states:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien against a
vessel or cargo of the foreign state, which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activ-
ity of the foreign state:
Provided, That-
(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to the person, or his agent, having possession of the vessel of cargo against which the
maritime lien is asserted; but such notice shall not be deemed to have been delivered,
nor may it thereafter be delivered, if the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to pro-
cess obtained on behalf of the party bringing the suit - unless the party was unaware
that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, in which event the service of
process of arrest shall be
(2) notice to the foreign state of the commencement of suit as provided in section 1608 of
this title is initiated within ten days either of the delivery of notice as provided in
subsection (b)(1) of this section or, in the case of a party who was unaware that the
vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, of the date such party determined the
existence of the foreign state's interest.
Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b)(1) of this section, the maritime lien shall
thereafter be deemed to be an in personam claim against the foreign state which at that time
owns the vessel or cargo involved: Provided, That a court may not award judgment against the
foreign state in an amount greater than the value of the vessel or cargo upon which the maritime
lien arose, such value to be determined as of the time notice is served under subsection (b)(1) of
this section.
9 The seminal article on this subject is Simmons, Admiralty Practice Under the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act -A Trap for the Unwary, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 109 (1980). See Roberts and
Warren, supra note 2; Comment, The Use of Procedure to Effect Equity: Section 1605(b) of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 129 (1982); Note, Maritime Arrest
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: An Anachronism, 62 TEx. L. REv. 511 (1983).
10 In maritime parlance, a pilot is a person who is taken aboard a vessel at a particular place for
the purpose of conducting the vessel from or into a port. A. PARKS, THE LAW OF TUG, Tow AND
PILOTAGE 1004 (2d ed. 1982). The term "compulsory pilot" refers to a pilot who is required by law
to be employed by an incoming or outgoing vessel. For accounts which portray the life and work of
pilots, see J. MARVIL, PILOTS OF THE BAY AND RIVER (1965); R. EASTMAN, PILOTS AND PILOT
BOATS OF BOSTON HARBOR (1958). One of the few law review articles on compulsory pilots is




although Congress probably did not intend the FSIA to change the rules
regarding compulsory pilots, it may well have done so inadvertently.
The uncertainty caused by this possibility forces a claimant, and ulti-
mately, a court, to guess what Congress may have had in mind. If one
reads the statute literally, it seems clear that, whether intended or not,
Congress did change the rules regarding compulsory pilots. The change
effected is a significant one, for it prohibits claimants from bringing any
type of suit against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities when
the compulsory pilot rules apply.
Faced with the possibility that a claimant may be denied the right to
bring a suit against a foreign sovereign because of Congress' inadvertent
change, a court may be tempted to read the statute in a way which pre-
serves the status quo. Since both of these alternatives - prohibiting a
claimant from suing or reading the statute in a manner divorced from the
language used - are unacceptable, this article will conclude by calling
for a redrafting of § 1605(b). Given the current interest in amending the
Act, such a change could easily be added to the many proposals now
being suggested.
I. THE LAW OF PILOTAGE
A. A Short History of Pilotage
As vessels enter and leave ports, their captains and crews must be
most vigilant. Unlike the times when a vessel is at open sea, navigation
in and out of local waters poses special risks to a seagoing ship. This is
true for several reasons. First, the amount of running room a ship has is
restricted. Sudden turns, adjustments to course, and short stops can be
made, if at all, only at great risk. Second, there are a number of obstruc-
tions which are found only in a harbor. Such obstructions include buoys,
channel markings, cable lines, and navigational lights. Although these
items are designed to help the mariner, they also act as an obstacle course
which must be navigated around. Third, the number of boats near a
manuvering ship is greatly increased. Not only are there other seagoing
ships coming into or leaving the harbor, but there are other vessels-
tugs, barges, fireboats, ferries and local patrol boats-which will never be
encountered except in the harbor. In addition, pleasure crafts, many of
them steered by casual or weekend boaters with little or no experience in
the rules of the road, will be present. Because of their small size, many of
these vessels will never venture far from land and are therefore unknown
in ocean traffic. All of these ships, from the ferry boat engaged in her
usual run, to the yacht cruising up and down the shore, have the poten-
tial for causing a collision with an ocean-going ship trying to leave or
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enter local waters. Finally, there are natural conditions which make nav-
igating in a harbor difficult and potentially dangerous. Sandbars, which
can quickly ground a ship, are just one example of a local condition not
found in open water. Indeed, some local conditions vary so much from
the norm that special rules, which completely contradict settled
shiphandling practice, have been adopted in some places. " Although
these local conditions will be marked on nautical charts, a captain of a
seagoing vessel will not be familiar with them, and is therefore apt to
misjudge their location or the danger that they pose.12
Since it is likely that the crew of an ocean going vessel will not real-
ize-let alone fully appreciate-the dangers posed by a port's local con-
ditions, there has developed a system of pilotage. Pilots are local
mariners who, because of their familiarity with a port, are able to assist
ships entering and leaving the harbor. The history of pilotage is very old,
stretching back to Roman times.13 Modem pilotage evolves from the
chartering of Trinity House in 1514 by King Henry VIII. 14 Trinity
House, which is still in existence today, is the body responsible for the
bulk of English pilotage. 5
1 1 In G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 7-13, at 514-15 (2d ed. 1975), a
number of such customs are collected. See Union Oil Co. v. Tug Mary Malloy, 414 F.2d 669 (5th
Cir. 1969) (approving of the custom that vessels proceeding down the Intracoastal Waterway give
right-of-way to vessels in the Neches River which are preparing to enter the Canal); The Luzerne,
204 F. 981 (2d Cir. 1913) (recognizing the custom that vessels coming out of the Harlem River yield
to westbound vessels in the East River); and The Transfer No. 21, 248 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1917) (follow-
ing the local custom that on a flood tide at Hell Gate a starboard to starboard passing, rather than
the usual port to port pass, was proper).
12 A thorough discussion of the problems and perils of navigating in and out of harbors and
ports is contained in A. QUINN, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCrION OF PORTS AND MARINE STRUC-
TURES (1961).
13 In Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. 236, 239 (1871), the Court wrote:
The obligation on the captain to take a pilot, or be responsible for the damages that might
ensue, was prescribed in the Roman Law. The Hanseatic ordinances, about 1457, required the
captain to take a pilot under the penalty of a mark of gold. The maritime law of Sweden, about
1500, imposed a penalty for refusing a pilot of 150 thalers, one-third to go to the informer, one-
third to the pilot who offered, and the residue to poor mariners. By the maritime code of the
Pays Bas the captain was required to take a pilot under a penalty of 50 reals, and to be responsi-
ble for any loss to the vessel. By the maritime law of France, ordinance of Louis the XIV, 1681,
corporal punishment was imposed for refusing to take a pilot, and the vessel was to pay 50
livres, to be applied to the use of the marine hospital and to repair damages from stranding. In
England (3 George I, ch. 13), if a vessel were piloted by any but a llcensed pilot, a penalty of£20
was to be collected for the use of superannuated pilots, or the widows of pilots.
14 Trinity House's charter was reconfirmed by Edward VI, Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth.
In 1604 James I expanded upon it. The charter was dissolved in 1647 but was renewed by Charles II
following the end of the Restoration. A. PARKS, supra note 10, at 1003.
15 Recently, however, Trinity House and her members have experienced economic difficulties
because of a fall in vessel traffic caused by the generally depressed state of worldwide shipping. In
response, the English government has introduced legislation which would reduce the number of
pilots. Such legislation has been strongly opposed by the pilots. See Mott, Ship Pilots Plan from




In the United States, pilots were well known by the time the First
Congress met in 1789. Finding that numerous state statutes were already
regulating local pilots, Congress passed legislation which approved the
continuation of state regulations until such time as Congress might
otherwise declare. 6 This legislation was later expanded to include state
regulation which regulated pilotage on any body of water which bounded
two states.
17
Congress' decision to leave pilotage regulation to the states was
challenged in the landmark case of Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the
Port of Philadelphia.8 Some years earlier, the Supreme Court had held
that pilotage was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal judici-
ary. 9 As such, it was an open question whether state - rather than
federal - regulation of pilots was constitutional.
The Court ruled that the State of Pennsylvania z° did have the power
to require ships in interstate and foreign commerce to take on local pilots
when entering or leaving the Port of Philadelphia. Interestingly enough,
the Court chose to look upon the case as one involving commerce rather
sponsibility for eastern Canada has made money, lowered rates, and hired additional pilots while the
pilotage authority for western Canada has lost money and not hired any new pilots. Canada Pilotage
Unit Scraps Tariff Schedule, J. of Corn., July 8, 1985, at IB, col. 3.
16 Originally passed as An Act of Congress of August 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 54, the statute read:
And be it further enacted that all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbors and ports of the
United States, shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the States
respectively wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the States may respectively hereaf-
ter enact for the purpose, until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress.
The current version of the law is codified at 46 U.S.C.A. § 8501(a) (West 1985).
17 The addition read:
The master or commander of any vessel coming into or going out of any port situate upon
waters, which are the boundary between two States, to employ any pilot duly licensed or au-
thorized by the laws of either of the States bounded on said waters, to pilot said vessel to or
from said port; any law, usage or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding An Act of Congress
of March 2, 1837, ch. 22, 5 Stat 153 (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 8501 (b) (West 1985)).
This provision proved somewhat difficult to interpret, since it was not clear whether the waters had
to be the actual boundary which separated the two states. When the issue was presented to the
courts, they opted for a strict interpretation. See Leech v. Louisiana, 214 U.S. 175 (1909); The Swift
Arrow, 292 Fed. 651 (D. Mass. 1923); The Gleneame, 7 Fed. 604 (D. Ore. 1881).
18 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
19 Hobart v. Drogan, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 108 (1836). The holding of Hobart was reaffirmed in Ex
parte Hagar, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 520 (1881) and Exparte Pennsylvania, 109 U.S. 174 (1883). For a
recent lower court case which followed Hobart, see Campos v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., Inc. 536
F.2d 970 (1st Cir. 1976).
20 Although the suit was brought to challenge the State law, the defendant was the Board of
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia. As A. PARKs, supra note 10, at 1086, has explained:
The legislatures of all the coastal States have, by statute, created boards or commissions to
govern the operation of pilots of their respective states; for the appointment and licensing of
such pilots; and, frequently, for the fixing of rates of rates for pilots. Such boards and commis-
sions are administrative agencies and, as such, are creatures of statute.
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than one involving admiralty or maritime law.2' The Court justified its
decision by relying upon the local nature of the regulated subject mat-
ter.22 For many years following the Cooley decision, the Court relied on
a national-local subject matter analysis to determine whether a particular
instance of State regulation of interstate commerce was permissible.23
Although this method of analysis had been abandoned by the mid-
1940s,24 it has reappeared in the Court's decisions from time to time.25
Despite the fact that Cooley approved of state pilotage systems in
clear and unequivocal terms, and was itself reaffirmed on a number of
occasions, 26 state pilotage systems were unable to function from 1852 to
1871 because of the passage of a federal statute which made it illegal for
21 As has been pointed out by a leading commentator, "No note was taken of such subtleties as
whether or not a statute which affects commerce but is motivated by a goal anterior to commercial
regulation should be deemed to regulate commerce." L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSrrruTONAL LAW
324 n.2 (1978). Professor Tribe points out that "Cooley was foreshadowed by a line of cases which
focused on the nature of the regulated subject matter rather than on the considerations that moti-
vated the regulation." Id.
22 The Court stated that the port conditions which gave rise to the creation of pilotage statutes
were "local peculiarities" properly regulated by the States. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
23 See, eg., Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866). In Wabash, the Court struck down an attempt by Illinois
to regulate intrastate railway rates, finding that if every state were to follow Illinois' lead, the cumu-
lative effect would overwhelm interstate commerce. Congress responded to the Court's decision by
creating the Interstate Commerce Commission to set railway rates. Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101 (1982)). For a maritime applica-
tion of Wabash, see Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Jensen held invalid a New
York workmen's compensation statute which provided compensation for longshoremen injured in
the course of their employment. The Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the principle of national uniformity by subjecting vessels travelling in interstate commerce to
different obligations depending upon the port in which they were anchored. Ten years later, Con-
gress responded by enacting the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act of 1927,
Pub. L. No. 803, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927). The Act was substantially amended in 1972 and, as
revised, now appears at 33 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1982). For a discussion of the Jensen case which places
it in its historical perspective, see Jarvis, Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Company: A New Oppor-
tunity For Industry to End State Regulation of Coastal Oil Pollution, 19 GONZ. L. REv. 265, 281-83
(1984).
24 In place of the national-local analysis, the Court substituted a two-part test which focuses on
the legitimacy of the end to be achieved by the State regulation and the importance of the regulation
vis-a-vis the burden that it puts on interstate commerce. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945); Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-87 (1950).
25 The best known instance of this happening came in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960). In that case the Court upheld the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code by writing
that "the states and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of interstate commerce and mari-
time activities, concurrently with the federal government." Id. at 442. See Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), which upheld a Florida anti-pollution statute de-
spite claims by shipowners that doing so would open the door to a multitude of confusing and
conflicting state statutes.
26 See, eg., Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S.




ocean-going ships to employ as a pilot any person who did not hold a
federal license.27 State pilots, as their name implies, hold only a state-
issued license.2" In Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Joliffe,2 9 however, the
Supreme Court ruled that the statute did not cover local pilots.30
B. Compulsory Pilotage
In some ports, ships are free to decide whether to take on a pilot.3"
In other ports, however, legislation requires ships to take on local pi-
lots.32 In a few ports, ships are permitted to travel without a pilot, but
only if they tender a fee.33
Despite their knowledge of local conditions, pilots occasionally have
collisions while commanding an inbound or outbound vessel. At such
times, the pilot is liable for any damage that he negligently causes.34 But
because pilots routinely turn out to be judgment proof, this liability is
more imaginary than real.3 Attempts were made to hold liable the pilot
27 For a discussion of this threat to state pilotage, see A. PARKS, supra note 10, at 1013-15.
28 The licensing of pilots is discussed id. at 1011-20. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 8501-8503 (West 1985).
29 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1864).
30 The result reached by the Court has been termed a "rescue" by A. PARKS, supra note 10, at
1013. As Parks points out, the statute made no exception which could be construed as permitting
state licensed pilots to operate. Thus, the Court had to read into the statute the exception that it
found. Such Herculean efforts by the Court were, as it later turned out, unnecessary, because Con-
gress repealed the offending Act in 1871. In its place, Congress substituted a new Act which clearly
excepted state pilots. Some years later Justice Hughes wrote that with this new Act, "[t]he existing
state laws respecting port pilotage again became operative." Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225
U.S. 187, 197 (1912).
31 Parks defines voluntary pilotage as referring "to jurisdictions which, by statute, permit the
owner or master of the vessel to pilot his own vessel, there being no provision requiring him to take
on a licensed pilot, or to pay. . . for not doing so." A. PAicS, supra note 10, at 1031.
32 Although such legislation is said to make a pilot "compulsory," courts have differed as to
what constitutes compulsory pilotage. Most courts have held that if the only choice which an owner
or master has is to either take the pilot or pay as if a pilot had been taken, the pilotage will be
considered compulsory. See, eg., The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1869). A minority of courts,
however, have held that a pilotage is compulsory only if a fine is attached to a refusal to take a pilot.
See, eg., Martin v. Hilton, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 371 (1845).
33 In some jurisdictions, the fee to be paid is equal to 100% of the compensation which the pilot
would have received had his services been accepted. In other ports, half-pilotage (meaning 50%)
must be tendered. See Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
34 Such instances of pilot negligence have received harsh judicial rebuke. The earliest reported
English case against a pilot for negligence appears to be Re Runney and Wood, Act Book, No. 128,
Aug. 1, 1541. The two pilots - Jacob Rumney and John Wood - were each barred from ever
serving as pilots again and were imprisoned for a year. They had allowed their respective vessels to
go aground on the shoals called the Isle of Peytewe. A. PARKS, supra note 10, at 1003-04. It should
be pointed out that if the vessel which the pilot is guiding is involved in a disaster through no fault of
the pilot, the pilot will be exonerated. See Andros Shipping Co. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 720
(5th Cir. 1962); Dampskibsselskabet Atalanta v. United States, 31 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1929).
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associations to which the guilty pilot belonged, but such attempts
failed.36 Lawsuits brought against the port authority which required the
taking of a pilot have proven to be somewhat more successful.37
If the pilot who caused the damage had been voluntarily taken on,
both the shipowner and the vessel would be liable for any resulting dam-
age, regardless of the liability of the pilot.38 If, however, the pilot was a
compulsory pilot, the shipowner would not be liable. This result has
been thought to be fair because it was felt that the respondeat superior
nexus between the shipowner and the crew had been broken by the pre-
sumably unwanted presence of the compulsory pilot.39 This rule was
firmly established just after the beginning of the 20th Century in the case
of Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-
tique.4 It was also held in that case, however, that the vessel's liability
was not relieved by the fact that she was under the command of a com-
pulsory pilot at the time of the accident.
Thus, at the time of the adoption of the FSIA in 1976, the rules
relating to compulsory pilots were fairly straightforward: a collision (or
other damage) caused by a compulsory pilot resulted in no liability for
the shipowner, but did result in liability for the ship. Although a ship's
captain had the right (which was later elevated to the status of a duty) to
take away control of the ship from a clearly incompetent pilot, even if the
pilot was compulsory, 41 a failure to do so (or a failure to not do so soon
36 Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399 (1906) is the leading case on the question. In Santiago v. Mor-
gan, 21 F. Cas. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1851) (No. 12,331), a pilot association was held liable for the negli-
gence of one of its members because the bills for pilotage were made out in the name of the
association and collected by the association. The court concluded that the association was a partner-
ship which was liable for the acts of its "partners." For a case which followed the reasoning of Guy,
see Port of Seattle v. M/V Maria Rubicon, 404 F. Supp. 302 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
37 See, eg., United States v. Port of Portland, 147 Fed. 865 (D. Ore. 1906), affid, 176 Fed. 866
(9th Cir. 1910). Cf State of Washington v. M/V Dilkara, 470 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Wash. 1979)
(more than mere licensing and regulation of pilots is required for imputing pilot negligence to the
State).
38 See Logue Stevedoring Corp. v. The Dazeilance, 198 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952); The Helen, 5
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1924).
39 See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 11, § 7-16, at 520.
40 182 U.S. 406 (1901). Although the case was concerned only with the common law liability of
the shipowner - as opposed to the liability resulting under maritime law - the case has always
been understood as barring both liabilities. See The Abangarez, 60 F.2d 543-44 (E.D. La. 1932). It
should be noted that the owner will escape liability only if the owner did not himself cause or con-
tribute to the accident. The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1869).
41 The master's duty to intervene was first stated in The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53, 67 (1869),
where it was said that, "It is the duty of the master to interfere in cases of the pilot's intoxication or
manifest incapacity, in cases of danger which he does not foresee, and in all cases of great neces-
sity .. " In The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1895), the Court wrote:
While the pilot doubtless supersedes the master for the time being in the command and naviga-




enough), would not cause the shipowner to lose his immunity from suit.4 2
II. SECTION 1605(b) OF THE FSIA
Section 1605(b) of the FSIA was enacted as a compromise between
foreign sovereigns"3 and United States claimants. The section regulates
in rem suits against foreign sovereigns. To understand the section, one
must understand that admiralty claims proceed by means of one of two
different types of suits. Claims against a shipowner proceed by means of
master is not wholly absolved from his duties while the pilot is on board, and may advise with
him, and even displace him in case he is intoxicated or manifestly incompetent. He is still in
command of the vessel, except so far as her navigation is concerned, and bound to see that there
is a sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their duties.
Although the master is under a duty to interfere, this duty only comes into being when the pilot is
patently incompetent or clearly incapacitated. In The "Hans Hoth," [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 341, 349,
the court explained that if the duty to intervene was not so tempered, "[i]t would be, in my judg-
ment, putting too much upon a master, and would be asking him to exercise more than ordinary care
* . . a master exercising ordinary and reasonable care is entitled to rely on the guidance which he
obtains from the local pilot."
42 The owner will be held liable if the cause of the collision was a deficiency of his own making.
In Hogge v. SS Yorkmar, 434 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1977), for example, the shipowner was held
liable despite the fact that the vessel had been under the command of a compulsory pilot at the time
of a bridge collision. The cause of the collision was determined to be an inoperable radio transmit-
ter, which made the vessel unseaworthy.
43 It is difficult to say what qualifies as a foreign sovereign for purposes of the FSIA. Although
28 U.S.C. § 1603 contains a number of definitions, it does not include a detailed definition of the
term "foreign state," the term used by the Act. Section 1603 does say that a foreign state includes its
agencies and instrumentalities; it also defines the United States as including all territory and water
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The lack of a detailed definition of a foreign state
could become problematic if a plaintiff attempted to sue a foreign "state" which was not diplomati-
cally recognized by the United States government. While the plaintiff would argue that the FSIA
did not apply, the defendant would claim that it was entitled to assert all of the protections and
defenses afforded by the Act. This could become very important if, for example, the plaintiff had
arrested a vessel belonging to a foreign state which did not have diplomatic recognition. Under
§ 1605(b), arrests of vessels owned by a foreign state are prohibited, and the plaintiff who arrests
such a vessel automatically loses all of its rights against the defendant. See Simons, supra note 9.
Whether the arrest would be proper, thereby allowing the suit to continue, or improper, thereby
ending the suit, would turn on whether the foreign state was a FSIA foreign state. A similar prob-
lem may be encountered if it is unclear which of several political factions represent the government
of a particular state. During the recent hijacking of TWA flight 847, the American government
reported that one of its biggest problems in negotiating the release of the hostages was that there did
not exist a single entity which appeared to have control over the situation. See Kifner, Again, the
Man to See In Lebanon Is in Syria, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1985, at 2E, col. 3. Although no cases to
date have considered the question of what is a foreign state, a few have considered what is an instru-
mentality of a foreign state. See, e.g., Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). The case is commented upon in Recent Developments, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
191 (1979). For a discussion of this subject in connection with the International Law Association's
Draft Convention on Foreign Sovereign Immunity, see Varges, Defining a Sovereign for Immunity
Purposer Proposals to Amend the International Law Association Draft Convention, 26 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 103 (1985). For a discussion of the general problem of whether as well as when to recognize a
foreign government, see J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER and N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 736-840 (2d ed. 1981).
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in personam suits. Claims against a ship, by contrast, proceed by means
of in rem suits. In rem suits are brought to enforce maritime liens, which
are claims against a vessel. According to § 1605(b)(2):
Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b)(1) of this Section, the
maritime lien shall thereafter be deemed to be an in personam claim against
the foreign state which at the time owns the vessel or cargo involved. Pro-
vided, That the court may not award judgment against the foreign state in
an amount greater than the value of the vessel or cargo upon which the
maritime lien arose ...
This section creates two quirks in the case of a collision caused by a
compulsory pilot while aboard a commercial ship that is owned by a
foreign sovereign.
The first quirk caused by § 1605(b) is that the ship's in rem liability
is converted into in personam liability against the foreign state. Section
1605 does not, however, convert the claim into a pure in personam suit.
One of the distinguishing features of an in personam suit is that, unlike
an in rem suit, any judgment received in an in personam suit can be en-
forced against all of the assets of the defendant, up to the full amount of
the judgment. A judgment rendered in an in rem suit, however, may
only be satisfied out of the proceeds of the ship itself, which is sold at a
judicial sale in order to raise funds to satisfy the judgment. If the sale
does not bring in enough money to satisfy the judgment creditor, the
creditor has no recourse.44
The distinction between in personam and in rem suits is the result of
an admiralty doctrine known as "personification." Under personifica-
tion, a ship is a juridical person which can sue and be sued and is capable
of committing wrongs. Personification separates the ship's interests (and
hence liabilities) from those of her owner, so that a claim against the
vessel does not also automatically result in a claim against the owner.
The doctrine of personification runs throughout the history of admiralty,
and has been judicially accepted in the United States,45 although not
elsewhere.46
44 In the normal case, no judicial sale of the ship is held. Instead, the owner of the ship puts up a
bond which takes the place of the ship. If the plaintiffs suit is successful, execution of the judgment
will be had against the bond. See infra text following note 50.
45 The concept of personification made its first appearance in The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979
(C.C.D. Va. 1819) (No. 15,612), a decision delivered by Chief Justice Marshall while riding circuit.
The first Supreme Court decision to recognize the doctrine of personification was The Palmyra, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). For a further discussion, see Note, Personification of Vessels, 77 HARV.
L. Rnv. 1122 (1964).
46 In England, for example, the doctrine of personification has not been accepted. Although it is
recognized that ships cause damage and that they may be arrested, the defendant is the shipowner.





Section 1605 represents a hybrid of the traditional in personam - in
rem system. Like the in personam suit that the statute provides, the
claim is against the ship's owner, and not the ship. But unlike an in
personam suit, the successful litigant can only recover up to an amount
equal to the value of the ship, regardless of the size of the judgment.
Although the FSIA does retain the plaintiff's traditional right to bring an
in personam suit to supplement the in rem recovery,4' this right does not
come into play where the compulsory pilot rules apply because under
Homer Ramsdell there is no right to proceed in personam.
To understand the second quirk caused by the Section's hybrid lan-
guage, it must be explained that in the normal situation where a party
has a claim against a vessel, the suit against the vessel begins by arresting
the vessel. This arrest accomplishes two purposes: first, it provides the
plaintiff with security for its claim, and second, it establishes personal
jurisdiction over the vessel in courts having territorial jurisdiction over
the place where the arrest is effectuated. In the normal course of events,
the shipowner, who receives no notice prior to the arrest,48 quickly
moves in after the arrest to free the ship, which is taken into the custody
of the United States marshal following the arrest and is not allowed to
leave the port while the arrest is in effect. In order to free the ship, the
shipowner posts a bond (or a letter of undertaking given by the ship-
owner's insurance underwriter or bank).49 Although by statute the arrest
is not lifted until the shipowner posts a bond in an amount twice that of
the plaintiffs claim,5" in practice such a large bond is never posted. In-
stead, the plaintiff and the defendant agree on a lower sum, which is
usually equal to the plaintiff's claim plus interest.
The bond or letter takes the place of the ship, and the defendant
must keep it in effect throughout the pendency of the lawsuit. Thus, the
47 H.R. RFP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6621.
48 Despite a number of Supreme Court cases in the 1970s which increased the amount and type
of notice required to be given to a defendant prior to the seizing of property, these cases have been
held inapplicable to admiralty procedures. For a recent article which collect the cases and reviews a
proposal to thoroughly revise the admiralty rules, see Culp, Charting A New Course: Proposed
Amendments to the Supplemental Rules forAdmiralty Arrest and Attachment, 15 . MAR. L. & COM.
353 (1984).
49 Plaintiffs are always wary when a letter of undertaking is proferred, because a letter, which
puts up no money, is only as good as the underwriter or bank which issues the letter. On the other
hand, defendants always seek to put up a letter, which costs nothing to keep in effect.
50 28 U.S.C. § 2464 (1982). Because of the ability of parties to a maritime suit to agree on
appropriate security, this section has become nearly obsolete. The most recent use of the statute
appears to have come in The Lotosland, F. Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1933), a case in which the court
allowed the release of a vessel despite the fact that the bond was in an amount less than that called
for by the section.
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first reason for the arrest (security) remains in place with the giving of
the bond. The second reason for the arrest (jurisdiction) is no longer
needed, since the appearance of the shipowner in the suit acts to confer
personal jurisdiction in the court.
Returning to § 1605(b), what is important to note is that it does not
require (or even make any provision for) the posting of a bond by a for-
eign sovereign who, except for its sovereign capacity, would be required
to put up a bond. The consequence of this result is twofold. First,
steamship lines run by foreign sovereigns are given a competitive advan-
tage over private steamship lines. As has been pointed out on numerous
occasions, the maritime industry is a capital-intensive industry."1 As
such, steamship lines are in a constant struggle to maintain and improve
their cash flow positions. This has become even more important in re-
cent years, when excess tonnage, high interest rates, and a depressed
world economy have combined to cause severe cash flow problems for
shipowners.52 Under § 1605(b), private shipowners must put up and
keep in place large bonds while the underlying lawsuits take years to
resolve. This expense is not suffered by foreign sovereign steamship lines,
which are not required to provide bonds. As a result, state-owned steam-
ship lines are in a better cash position and have the option of offering
lower freight rates to their customers. 53
The other consequence of § 1605(b) is that it places litigants who
suffer damage as a result of a foreign sovereign-owned ship in a different
position than that occupied by litigants who suffer harm caused by a
privately owned ship. While the latter type of plaintiff has its security
from the outset of the suit, the former must depend on the fiscal integrity
of the foreign government. Moreover, it is not the foreign sovereign's
51 G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra note 11, § 9-51 (a), at 702 have written, for example, "that
shipping is a perhaps uniquely risky enterprise, as vulnerable to the perils of the market-place as the
ships themselves are to the perils of the sea." Professors Gilmore and Black note that the U.S.
government was eventually forced to provide federally insured ship financing because the risk factor
made it impossible to attract private financing for shipbuilding.
52 The shipping industry has suffered more in recent years than at any time in the past fifty
years. Bankruptcies have become commonplace, with such large companies as Hellenic Lines and
Saleninvest having fallen victim. See Hayman & Glass, The Hellenic Inheritance, 13 SEATRADE 3
(1983); Sweden's Saleninvest Announces Bankruptcy, J. of Com., Dec. 20, 1984, at IA, As a result of
the dismal state of the market, many banks have cut off their funding of the industry, causing further
problems. See Porter, Heavily Indebted Shipping Sector Faces Slowdown in Bank Lending, J. of
Com., Jan. 7, 1985, at IA, col. 3-5.
53 Whether state-owned steamship lines are actually lowering their freight rates is difficult to say.
It is possible that such shipping lines have not felt the need to lower their rates, because of the
favorable position they occupy as to travel to and from their home countries. It is also possible that
they have not lowered their freight rates because their central banks are in need of foreign currency,




fiscal integrity at the time the damage occurs which is important.
Rather, it is the fiscal integrity of the foreign government at the time the
suit is finally concluded and the plaintiff seeks to enforce its judgment.
When one includes time for appeals, the time between the inquiry and
attempts to enforce the judgment can easily be five years. During that
time, a foreign government can suffer a downturn in its economy, can
institute a policy of nationalization or remove its United States-based as-
sets, or be overthrown and replaced by a revolutionary government
which refuses to accept responsibility for injuries caused by the prior
government.54
Despite these concerns, some might argue that the plaintiff who sues
a foreign sovereign is in at least as secure a position, if not in a better
position, than the plaintiff who sues a private defendant. Such propo-
nents argue that the likelihood of the foreign sovereign disappearing
before the end of the lawsuit, although a possibility, is far less likely to
occur than the reverse: a private defendant disappearing, either through
bankruptcy or dissolution. This argument, however, is more illusory
than real for two reasons.
First, the plaintiff who sues a private defendant need not worry
about whether the defendant survives to the end of the lawsuit. This is
because, whether the defendant remains in business or not, the security
(either the ship, bond or letter) will survive the lawsuit. Since a foreign
sovereign puts up no security, the best that can be said for a plaintiff who
sues a foreign sovereign is that it may be in no worse a position than a
plaintiff who sues a private steamship line.
The second reason why the argument is illusory is because a plaintiff
who receives a judgment against a public defendant has to do extra work
to enforce the judgment. While the plaintiff who sues a private defendant
can enforce its judgment simply by moving against the bond (or other
security), the plaintiff who wins against a foreign sovereign must go
through the normal enforcement processes. While this may not be a
problem if the sovereign willingly satisfies the judgment, it can become a
very expensive and time consuming exercise if the defendant decides not
54 Following the fall of the Pahlavi government in Iran, the new Revolutionary government
refused to honor many of the contracts which had been concluded by the previous regime. When
President Carter ordered the U.S.-based assets of Iran to be frozen following the taking of American
hostages, numerous suits involving those assets were brought under the FSIA. The various suits are
collected and discussed in McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis and US. Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
384 (1980). The claims were later transferred to the Hague for resolution before a panel of arbitra-
tors as part of the terms agreed to by the United States in return for the release of the hostages. See
Comment, Dames & Moore v. Regan - Rights in Conflict" The Fifth Amendment Held Hostage, 31
AM. U. L. REv. 345 (1982).
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to cooperate.5
III. COMPULSORY PILOTS AND THE FSIA
The general rules applicable to compulsory pilots have been modi-
fied by § 1605(b), although this change was certainly unforseen by Con-
gress. 6 As will be recalled, a compulsory pilot who negligently operates
a vessel and thereby causes damage subjects the vessel to in rem liability.
But such acts on the part of the compulsory pilot do not subject the
shipowner to in personam liability. Whether this rule remains intact with
the adoption of the FSIA is an open question, since the Act converts in
rem suits into in personam suits. Put another way, could a foreign sover-
eign, whose ship has been involved in a collision while under the com-
mand of a compulsory pilot, plead that it has no in personam liability
because damages caused by compulsory pilots lead to only in rem liabil-
ity, which the FSIA eliminates?
The answer to this question would seem to be an affirmative one,
because the FSIA changes in rem suits into in personam suits. As such,
the only liability which exists after enactment of the FSIA is in personam
liability. Of course, shipowners, including shipowners who are foreign
sovereigns, have no in personam liability if the cause of the plaintiff's
damages is a compulsory pilot.
The foregoing argument, if accepted, would leave a plaintiff without
any remedy. A plaintiff confronted with such a defense would undoubt-
edly argue that the intent of Congress in passing the FSIA could not
possibly have been to leave plaintiffs without any recourse. In support of
its argument, the plaintiff would turn to the legislative history of the Act.
But the legislative history of the FSIA is not helpful. The House Report
which accompanied the FSIA states that the Act does not change the
substantive law of liability.57 In considering the question, the Third Cir-
cuit concluded that the FSIA neither provides a cause of action nor dic-
tates substantive rules of liability.5"
55 FSIA § 1610 does authorize a limited number of circumstances in which a successful plaintiff
may attach property owned by a foreign sovereign in order to execute a judgment. The property
which may be so attached, however, must be in the United States. If the foreign state has no assets
in the United States, the FSIA provides no assistance to a judgment creditor.
56 Nothing in the legislative history of the FSIA even remotely suggests that Congress under-
stood the effect that § 1605(b) would have on the compulsory pilot rules.
57 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6610.
58 Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 455 U.S. 929
(1982). In First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620
(1983), the Supreme Court agreed with this position by writing: "The language and history of the




The difficulty, of course, is that it is not clear from this legislative
history which substantive law remains unchanged. Is it the substantive
law of in rem suits that is untouched by the FSIA, or only the substantive
law of in personam suits that is unaffected? Of course, it could be argued
that the FSIA simply does not create any new causes of action, but does
abolish previous causes of action. The real problem, for present pur-
poses, is that the legislative history speaks only of the Act's effect on
"substantive" law. The rule of Homer Ramsdell that no in personam
remedy can be had against the shipowner is, however, not technically a
rule of substantive law. It is, instead, a rule of procedural law, since it
determines who may be sued, rather than the basis on which liability will
be assessed against a wrongdoer. As such, even if the FSIA does not
affect the substantive law of liability, this statement does not help to re-
solve the outcome of cases governed by the compulsory pilot rules.
If, despite the language of the FSIA and the House Report, one
were inclined to argue that the plaintiff could maintain its suit, one
would have to argue that the conversion of the suit from an in rem to an
in personam suit has to be seen from the perspective of the compromise
struck by Congress. Looked upon as a political solution to a difficult
problem, one could argue that an in rem action could still be maintained
because the foreign sovereign itself is the equivalent of the bond that a
private defendant would have to put up. The problems with this argu-
ment, as pointed out above, 9 are that foreign sovereigns receive an unfair
competitive advantage over private defendants and may turn out to be
less judgment worthy than a private defendant who is forced to put up
security.
IV. RETHNKING § 1605(b) IN LIGHT OF
THE OBJECTIVES oF THE FSIA
The problems discussed above are the result of the curious language
employed by the draftsmen of the FSIA. In order to assess how the
problems should be resolved, it is useful to recall the reasons why the
FSIA was enacted.
The FSIA was designed to accomplish three objectives. First, it was
meant to codify the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity. Under
the restrictive principle of immunity, a foreign state is immune from suits
liability of a foreign state or instrumentality, or the attribution of liability among instrumentalities of
a foreign state." The Court repeated this position in Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 497 (1983): "The Act codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect
of federal substantive law. .. "
59 See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
1025
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:1010(1984-85)
only when the acts involved are public acts (lure imperfi). No immunity
is granted for commercial or private acts (ure gestionis).
The rise of the restrictive theory of immunity followed the fall of the
doctrine of absolute immunity. During the colonial period, of course, the
King was immune from suit.' Various rationales were put forward to
explain why the Crown could not be sued. Some argued that the King,
endowed with divine guidance, could do no wrong.61 Others contended
that although the King could do wrong, no court had the power to hear
suits against the sovereign. This view had two underpinnings, one practi-
cal, one theoretical. Practically speaking, if a court were to render a
judgment against the Crown, the Crown could retaliate by tightening the
purse strings, thereby shutting down the courts. Theoretically speaking,
suits against the Crown were not entertained because it was thought im-
proper for a sovereign to be judged in its own court by its own judges.62
A final concern, with both practical and theoretical overtones, was the
fear that if a judgment were rendered against the King, the judgment
would be unenforceable without the assistance of the Crown.63
The doctrine of absolute immunity was applied to the federal gov-
ernment following the end of English rule. It is surprising that this
should have been the case, given the fact that the Revolution was fought
because of perceived abuses by the Crown of its perogatives.64 The prob-
able explanation lies in the fact that without such immunity, the fledgling
government would have had its limited treasury exhausted.65 In 1796,
60 For a discussion of the historical development of sovereign immunity, see J. MATTERN, CON-
CEPTS OF STATE, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928); C. MERRIAM, HISTORY OF
THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU (1900); see also J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1963).
61 For a discussion of this principle, see Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476 (1953); Parker, The King Does No Wrong - Liability for Mis-
administration, 5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1952); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36
YALE L.J. 1 (1926).
62 See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
63 A stark example of just how weak judicial power can be in the face of a sovereign who refuses
to cooperate came in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Despite a clear contrary
holding by the Court, President Jackson pushed forward with his plans to move the Cherokee Indi-
ans from their homes in Georgia to the West. See W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NT-
SHELL 16 (1981).
64 It has been written that, "[though the notion of sovereign immunity might seem best suited to
a government of royal power, the doctrine was nevertheless accepted by American judges in the
early days of the republic .. " W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1033
(footnote omitted) (5th ed. 1984).
65 Indeed, it was not until 1887 that the United States government felt confident enough to enact
the so-called Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982)),





the enactment of the eleventh amendment extended the defense of sover-
eign immunity to state governments.66
It was against this background that the United States Supreme
Court decided The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.67 In the suit, two
American citizens had sought to establish their ownership of a French
warship, which had been seized in United States waters. The federal gov-
ernment filed a suggestion that the vessel should be released, because it
belonged to a nation with which the United States had friendly relations.
The district court agreed, and ordered the suit dismissed. The Circuit
Court reversed the district court's decision. On appeal, the Supreme
Court agreed with the district court and ordered the vessel released. The
Court explained that its decision was grounded in public international
law, under which foreign warships cannot be arrested while at anchor in
the ports of friendly nations.68 Within the next few years, the Supreme
Court extended the immunity of warships to privately owned ships which
had been commissioned by foreign governments to act as privateers,69
and to the armed vessels of recognized belligerents.70 This was followed
by a general widening of the immunity by lower federal courts.7"
In Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro,72 the Supreme Court
extended the immunity that it had granted to warships in The Schooner
Exchange to commercial ships owned by foreign sovereigns.7" The Court
did note, however, that Congress could change the rule by treaty or stat-
ute.7 4 Following the Pesaro, lower courts routinely held that an Ameri-
can citizen could not arrest a foreign owned vessel.7 5
Finally, in 1952 the State Department announced, in a statement
66 The eleventh amendment was enacted to counter the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), in which the Court allowed two citizens of South
Carolina to sue the State of Georgia. The decision and the amendment are discussed in C. JACOBS,
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SovEREIGN IMMUNrry (1972).
67 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
68 Warships continue to be immune from jurisdiction, and indeed enjoy special privileges in
peacetime. These privileges are continued in Articles 29-32 of the recently concluded United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). See 17 Third U.N. Conference on the Law
of the Sea Official Records 151, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL
MATERi .S 1261 (1982).
69 See L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 238 (1816).
70 See The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822).
71 See The Pizarro v. Matthias, 19 F. Cas. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 11,199); Walley v.
Schooner Liberty, 12 La. 98 (1838).
72 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
73 Id. at 574.
74 Id.
75 If a plaintiff could keep the State Department from issuing a recommendation for sovereign
immunity, the plaintiff could arrest a foreign sovereign's vessel. But even if the plaintiff cleared this
hurdle and then won its suit, it could not execute on the foreign sovereign's vessel to satisfy the
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which later became known as the "Tate Letter, '7 6 that it would hence-
forth adhere to the restrictive theory of immunity. Under the restrictive
theory, only vessels engaged in the public service of a foreign nation
would be entitled to claim sovereign immunity.7 7 The Tate Letter, how-
ever, was undermined by the State Department, which continually inter-
vened into lawsuits to urge that a particular defendant be allowed to
assert sovereign immunity despite the fact that it was not entitled to do
so under the restrictive theory." Finally, enough support was mustered
in Congress to codify the Tate Letter and remove the State Department
from its decision making role.79
The second objective of the Act was to provide, for the first time, a
statutory procedure for making service upon, and obtaining in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign state. Doing so made the previous practice of
judgment. See New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
76 Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Acting Attorney
General Philip Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
77 One problem which received much consideration in the law reviews during this period was the
nature of a vessel engaged in the public service of a foreign socialist or communist nation that did
not recognize public/private distinctions in property distribution. For representative thinking dur-
ing this period, see Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and State Trading, 56
Nw. U. L. REv. 109 (1961). This problem became a reality following enactment of the FSIA, when
socialist defendants argued that they were immune from prosecution because they were in the service
of their state. See Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827
(D.D.C. 1977). The case is reviewed in Recent Developments, Foreign Sovereign Immunity - The
Status of Legal Entities in Socialist Countries as Defendants Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 12 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 165 (1979).
78 See Recent Decisions, Sovereign Immunity - The State Department's Decision to Recognize
and Allow the Claim of Sovereign Immunity Is Binding upon the Courts and Is Not Subject to Review
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 488 (1975); Note, The American
Law of Sovereign Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1964). For cases in which
the political concerns of the State Department played a role in the decision whether to allow a
foreign sovereignty engaged in commercial operations to plead sovereign immunity, see British
Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129 (1957); The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S. 151 (1922); The
Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1921); The Carlo Poma, 255 U.S. 219 (1921); Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522
(1921); The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1953).
79 One of the points most often urged in support of the enactment of the FSIA was the need to
remove the State Department from playing any role in deciding whether to allow a foreign state to
plead sovereign immunity. See, eg., Note, Sovereign Immunity - Proposed Statutory Elimination of
State Department Role, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 157 (1974). It was argued that by allowing the State
Department to play such a role, the Executive Branch was intruding into a sphere reserved for the
Judiciary, thus upsetting the delicate balance struck by the constitution's separation of powers. See
Comment, Proposed Draft Legislation on the Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Governments? An At-
tempt to Revest the Courts with a Judicial Function, 69 Nw. U. L. REv. 302 (1974). Shortly after the
FSIA was enacted, some commentators began to suggest that the Executive Branch should have at
least a limited role to play in any litigation brought under the Act. See, eg., Carl, Suing Foreign
Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice,




seizing the property of the foreign state unnecessary, and so reduced a
source of considerable friction between the United States and foreign
sovereigns.
The final goal of the FSIA was to provide a remedy for a judgment
creditor if the foreign state fails to satisfy a final judgment. The remedy's
usefulness, however, is limited by the extent that the foreign sovereign
has assets in the United States.
V. MARITIME LIENs UNDER THE FSIA
In light of the objectives stated above, one cannot help but realize
that the purposes of the FSIA are not served if a sovereign is able to
completely avoid liability when its ship causes damage through a com-
pulsory pilot. The crucial issue, of course, is whether an action under
§ 1605(b) is an in personam suit or is an in rem suit dressed up to resem-
ble an in personam suit. To answer this question, one must focus on the
concept of maritime liens as expressed in § 1605(b).
A maritime lien is a substantive right in and of itself.80 Historically,
maritime liens have been enforced through in rem actions. The issue
therefore is whether a maritime lien can exist without an in rem action.
If it can, then the FSIA's command that the plaintiff's maritime lien will
be enforced through an in personam action is not problematic. But if
maritime liens can only be enforced through in rem actions, then the lack
of an in rem action under the FSIA is fatal.
Courts have never been able to decide whether maritime liens can
exist where no in rem suit is possible. Consider, for example, the Fourth
Circuit's leading opinion Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T.8 The court
first stated that a maritime lien did not depend upon the existence of an
in rem suit:
This procedure [arresting a vessel], moreover, was used long before it was
embodied in the rule. Its purpose has always been to provide a means for
enforcing a maritime lien, which is the central element of an in rem pro-
ceeding. Maritime liens, however, are not created by the rule They are an
integral aspect of substantive, rather than procedural, maritime law. 82
In the next paragraph, however, the court contradicted itself:
The vessel itself is viewed as the obligor whether or not the owner is also
80 For a discussion of maritime liens, see Hebert, The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens, 4
TUL. L. REv. 381 (1930); Ryan, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Maritime Lien: An Historical Per-
spective, 7 WEsTERN ONT. L. REv. 173 (1968); Toy, Introduction to the Law of Maritime Liens, 47
TUL. L. REv. 559 (1973); Comment, Developments in the Law of Maritime Liens, 45 TUL. L. REv.
574 (1971).
81 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1980).
82 Id. at 908 (emphasis added).
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obligated. Substantive maritime law confers on the holder of a maritime
lien a sufficient interest in the vessel to detain it for security and ultimately
to subject it to condemnation and sale for satisfaction of the lien. The arrest
of the vessel in the proceeding in rem [sic] is to accomplish this end. "The
lien and the proceeding in rem are, therefore, correlative-where one exists,
the other can be taken, and not otherwise. ,83
Research does not resolve whether a maritime lien can be enforced
without an in rem action. Except for a single instance, however, there
appears to be no example of a maritime lien being enforced through any-
thing other than an in rem suit. The exception is contained in the Suits
in Admiralty Act of 1920 (SAA). 84
The SAA embodies the United States' waiver of the defense of sov-
ereign immunity in admiralty cases. The Act provides that no vessel
owned or under the control of the government may be sued by means of
an in rem proceeding. 5 Instead, the SAA states that a claimant may
maintain an in personam proceeding against the United States for any
claim which, except for the bar of sovereign immunity, could be pursued
by either an in personam or in rem suit. Despite the rather exceptional
nature of the SAA, a leading commentary on maritime law explained the
SAA's treatment of in rem suits by blandly stating that: "First, no in
rem process is available; this is, of course, of complete unimportance,
since the maritime lien is a security device, and the government's credit is
good."86
The FSIA does not purport, either by its own terms or in the House
Report, to have patterned § 1605(b) on the SAA, and to conclude other-
wise would be a mistake for two reasons. First, unlike a foreign sover-
eign, the United States will be found to be amenable to jurisdiction in
every case arising under the SAA, since the United States government
can be found everywhere. The same cannot be said for any foreign sover-
eign. Second, the United States government will always have assets in
the United States. Again, the same can not be said about a foreign sover-
eign. Thus, while discussions about the government's credit may be use-
ful in considering the SAA, they miss the point when the focus shifts to
the FSIA. In a FSIA suit, it is not the credit of the foreign government
which is at stake (although, of course, one would prefer a creditworthy
foreign state). What is at stake is the ability to reach, both in the short
run and in the long run, whatever that credit is based on. In the short
run a plaintiff must be able to reach the foreign government to establish
83 Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
84 41 Stat. 525-28, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1982).
85 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1982).




jurisdiction, while in the long run the foreign sovereign must be reached
in order to satisfy the judgment. Put simply, the SAA's in rem proce-
dures (or lack thereof) cannot be the basis of the FSIA's in rem proce-
dures because, unlike the United States government, no foreign sovereign
will always be available in the United States.
Since, save for the SAA, there has always been an in rem procedure
available wherever there has been a recognized maritime lien, it would
seem fair to say that a maritime lien cannot exist where no in rem action
can be maintained. If this is so, then the FSIA must take away in rem
suits based on the acts of compulsory pilots, since § 1605(b) states that
all in rem suits must proceed as in personam suits. This result is dis-
turbing, however, because, as noted above,87 the House Report states
that the FSIA does not change the substantive maritime law.
A large part of the problem with § 1605(b) stems from the words
that it uses. It says that after proper notice has been given to the defend-
ant sovereign, "the maritime lien shall thereafter be deemed to be an in
personam action." The culprit here is the word "deemed." Black's Law
Dictionary defines the word deem as: "To hold; consider; adjudge; be-
lieve; condemn; determine; treat as if, construe.""8 Moreover, in China
National Chemical Import & Export Corp. v. M/VLago Hualaihue,9 a
District Court in Maryland wrote that "1605(b) was designed to provide
a substitute for the usual in rem proceeding. ..
Taken together, the dictionary definition and the China National
case would appear to support reading § 1605(b) as having done away
with the usual in rem proceeding and replacing it with an in personam
proceeding. Testimony regarding § 1605(b) prior to the passage of the
FSIA, however, does not support such a reading. In a statement pre-
pared by the District of Columbia Bar, it was argued that: "Section
1605(b) is not intended to deprive litigants of any substantive rights, but
instead to provide a new method of enforcing maritime liens without
seizure of vessels of foreign states." 91
Of course, this statement is merely opinion, and as such it is ques-
tionable whether, under normal rules of statutory construction, it may be
considered. As Justice Holmes so bluntly wrote years ago in a slightly
different context: "[W]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we
87 See supra note 57.
88 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 374 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
89 504 F. Supp. 684 (D. Md. 1981).
90 Id. at 689.
91 Jurisdictions of US. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States. Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976).
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only ask what the statute means."92
Section 1605(b) as presently drafted is undeniably ambiguous. One
commentator has argued that the ambiguity is the result of Congress'
desire to avoid the arrest of foreign sovereign-owned vessels while pre-
serving the in rem proceeding: "The obvious solution was to preserve the
maritime lien but convert it to an in personam [sic] claim in order to keep
intact the policy of avoiding jurisdictional attachments of foreign states'
property. '93
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
It has been suggested that the complexities of maritime law make it
desirable to have a separate FSIA just for admiralty.94 Although the
merits of such a scheme could be argued at length, for present purposes
such a radical restructuring of the FSIA is unnecessary. Instead, the
solution lies in redrafting § 1605(b). 95
In the redraft of the section, a foreign sovereign's vessels would still
be free from arrest. However, when a plaintiff brought a suit which,
under normal circumstances, would require a non-sovereign defendant to
post bond, a foreign sovereign would be required to put up a bond (or
irrevocably pledge some other form of acceptable security). The amount
of the bond would be equal to 125% of the plaintiff's claim, so that the
plaintiff would be assured of collecting on its claim with interest.
Although the foreign sovereign would probably put up a standard bond,
it could put up any other security which the court having jurisdiction
92 o. HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920),
quoted in 2A SANDs, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 45.07, at 30
n.1 (N. Singer, rev. 4th ed. 1984).
93 Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50 FoRDHA L. REv.
155, 217 (1981).
94 Yiannopoulos, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Arrest of State-Owned Ships: The Need
for an Admiralty Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1274 (1983).
95 The redrafting of § 1605(b) could be accomplished by replacing the language which appears
after subsection (2) with the following language:
(3) Within ten days of having received the notice specified in either subsection (1) or (2) of this
section, a foreign state shall be required, in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought
to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, which maritime
lien is based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state, to post a bond or other
security acceptable to the court, in an amount equal to 125% of the plaintiff's claim. Such
bond or security shall be maintained by the foreign state throughout the pendency of the
lawsuit, and, in the event of a judgment being entered in the plaintiff's favor, may be
executed upon in the manner and terms prescribed in section 1610 of this chapter. An
allegation of a counterclaim by the foreign state does not relieve the operation of this
section, although the court hearing the matter may, in its discretion, require the plaintiff to
put up such security as it deems necessary to secure the counterclaim. A failure without
sufficient cause to post the required bond within fifteen days of service will entitle the
plaintiff to summary judgment. If summary judgment is granted, the foreign state may not




over the suit found acceptable. In the event that a foreign sovereign re-
fused to post security, the court would be empowered to treat the failure
as an admission of liability and enter a default judgment against the sov-
ereign. Further, the sovereign would not be allowed to appeal the deci-
sion until it had posted security. Such a provision would allow a plaintiff
to immediately seek redress of its damages.
With it possible to bring an in rem suit against a foreign sovereign,
the curious hybird language of § 1605(b) could be eliminated. Since the
bond would take the place of the foreign state's ship, the action against
the foreign sovereign would duplicate an in rem action against a non-
public defendant. In cases webre no in personam liability exists, such as
compulsory pilot cases, courts would not be faced with the difficult
choice of having to decide whether § 1605(b) preserves in rem suits.
In addition to benefitting United States plaintiffs, the requirement
that a foreign state post a bond would take away the unfair advantage
enjoyed by state-owned shipping lines. Under the redraft, the only differ-
ence between an in rem suit against a foreign sovereign and a private
shipowner would be that a foreign sovereign's vessel could not be ar-
rested. Of course, it would not matter that a foreign sovereign's vessel
could not be arrested, because the foreign sovereign would still be re-
quired to post a bond just as if its vessel had been arrested. Thus, the
only advantage a foreign sovereign would enjoy over a private shipowner
is that its ships would not be arrested. Since, in the usual case, the time
between a ship's arrest and her release because adequate security has
been arranged is very short (often less than twenty-four hours), the ad-
vantage enjoyed by a foreign sovereign would be slight at best. Such a
small advantage can certainly be justified in light of the Congress' over-
riding sense that the arresting of a foreign sovereign's vessel, even for
short periods of time, seriously impairs the success of the United States'
foreign policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The FSIA was enacted to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity and resolve problems which had developed in the ad hoc ad-
ministration of the theory. Ten years later, we are learning that
problems still exist with the Act. As we conclude a decade of living
under the FSIA-and prepare ourselves for the next ten years-we
should take the time to eliminate the problems which ten years of prac-
tice have revealed. One of the problems which must be addressed is the
ambiguous language of § 1605(b), especially in light of the compulsory
pilot problem. Although no court to date has passed on the relationship
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between the FSIA and the compulsory pilot rule, there is a case pending
in the Southern District of New York which does raise the issue.96 Re-
gardless of that suit's resolution,97 Congress should be the one to decide
such fundamental questions as whether the FSIA allows in rem
proceedings.
98
96 Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A. v. French-Polish Shipping Co., Polish Ocean Lines,
and the M/V Kazimierz Pulaski, No. 84 Civ. 1478 (DNE) (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 1, 1984). The
Pulaski regularly makes trips into and out of Port Newark. On a recent trip out of Newark, and
while under the direction of a pilot, the Pulaski struck a rock, puncturing an oil tank and resulting in
a two-mile oil spill. Reid, Crews Clearing Up Oil Spilled by Ship Off&L, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985,
at B4, col. I.
[Until May 1985, this author was associated with the law firm representing the defendants
French-Polish, Polish Ocean Lines, and the M/V Pulaski.-Ed.]
97 If properly decided, the Court should hold there is no in rem or in personam liability. As to
the former, there is no liability because of the rule of Homer Ramsdell. As to the latter, the Court
should decide that there is no liability by construing the ambiguity of § 1605(b) against the drafters
of the statute and in favor of the foreign state. Although doing so works to the disadvantage of the
particular plaintiff, it conforms to the language of the Act. Section 1604 states that "a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 and 1607 of this chapter." Since the purpose of § 1604 is to invest in
foreign states absolute immunity subject to the specific exceptions created in §§ 1605 and 1607, any
doubt as to whether a particular situation qualifies for immunity should be resolved by resorting to
the broad language of § 1604 rather than the narrow language of §§ 1605 and 1607.
98 FSIA § 1602 states that "claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided
by the courts .. " This, however, should not be read as authority for allowing judges to decide
whether, in accidents involving compulsory pilots, in rem liability still exists. This is because what is
at stake is not the mere adjudication of a case, but rather, the setting of policy. When policy setting
is involved, it is preferable for Congress, rather than the courts, to take the lead. The Supreme Court
recognized and applied this principle in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282 (1952), when it ruled that whether a right of contribution existed among joint tortfeasors in
admiralty was a policy question best left to the wisdom of Congress.
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